January 26, 2007 - A judgment for intentional fraud and willful violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act against Checkered Flag Motor Car Company was entered by the Virginia Beach Circuit Court on January 26, 2007 based on an arbitration decision by an arbitrator, retired Norfolk Circuit Court Judge, John E. Clarkson.

Judge Clarkson found that Checkered Flag fraudulently misrepresented the vehicle to Sunshine Hardison, as a one owner non-wrecked vehicle and that it concealed the vehicle’s prior repossession, something which the Virginia Consumer Protection Act requires to be disclosed, according to John Cole Gayle, Jr., of The Consumer Law Group, a Richmond law firm, who represented Ms. Hardison along with John M. Barrett of Virginia Beach. In fact, according to the decision, the vehicle had been owned by numerous owners, repossessed, had suffered a serious front end collision, all of which the dealership knew about, and the mileage was questionable. During the purchase, when Ms. Hardison asked why there was a dent in the engine, Checkered Flag’s salesman stated it came from a wrench falling on it. After purchase, when Ms. Hardison brought the vehicle back to Checkered Flag with her concerns, it stated that there was nothing it could do about it since she had driven it off the lot.

In assessing damages, Judge Clarkson awarded Ms. Hardison $2,500 in compensatory damages, and these damages were trebled to $7,500.00 due the willful violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (VCPA). He awarded $50,000 in punitive damages for the intentional fraud (with the dealership getting a credit for the $7,500 in punitive damages awarded under the VCPA), and he awarded $57,321.50 in attorney fees to Ms. Hardison’s attorneys. Furthermore, he ordered Checkered Flag to pay the $4,738.20 cost of the arbitration to The McCammon Group, the company that administered the arbitration. The dealership has now paid its obligation, said Gayle.

“Car dealers have no problem spotting prior accident damage when making an offer on a trade in, but when buyers confront the dealer after a sale about undisclosed wreck damage, the dealer always claims that it did not know about the wreck,” said Mr. Gayle. “Checkered Flag did the same thing in this case, under oath, but what turned the tide was the discovery of the person that had owned the vehicle when it was wrecked and sold it back to Checkered Flag. She testified that when she traded it back to Checkered Flag, she told them about the accident.”

“Just like its claim that it didn’t know about the prior wreck, Checkered Flag claimed that it had no knowledge of the vehicle’s repossession history, but when confronted with its own title records showing the repossession of the vehicle, it had to change its story.”

"Numerous previously wrecked and potentially unsafe vehicles are sold every day by car dealers to unsuspecting buyers. Is there anything that can be done to even the playing field and make a vehicle’s accident history more transparent? “Yes,” says Mr. Gayle. “First, every accident that is reported to an insurance company is reported to a national database maintained by insurance companies for the prevention of insurance fraud. These companies know, with one mouse click, whether a vehicle has ever been in an accident and how serious it was. This database is much larger and more thorough than services consumers have access to such as Carfax. Congress needs to pass a law requiring a car dealer to review this database with every sale and either give consumers access to this database, or at least, disclose any accident information on this database about the vehicle to the buyer. Second, Virginia could pass a law, just like the current North Carolina law, that requires a seller to disclose, to the best of its knowledge, whether a vehicle has been in an accident whenever a vehicle’s title is transferred. There’s no reason this could not be done here, other than the car dealers would use their political muscle to stop it.” Services like Carfax are OK, but they are not foolproof, says Gayle. “Since they are dependent on vehicle history information voluntarily provided to them by other companies, if individuals or companies choose not to report a repair, then there is no way it ever gets into their database. Carfax often gives buyers a false sense of security when the report is clean.”

"Hopefully this case is a warning to car dealers throughout Virginia to thoroughly inspect vehicles when they buy them, to get any seller, whether a wholesaler or individual, to sign a document that says whether or not the vehicle has been in an accident, and if they are going to sell previously wrecked vehicles, to get a written statement from that buyer that shows this information was disclosed.”

A: Often this question comes up when a dealership closes and vehicles that were traded in on the purchase of another car have liens that never get paid off by the dealer. The lien holder sends a letter to the consumer that their monthly payment is late on a loan they thought had been paid off by the now defunct dealership.

This scary problem scenario does not have an easy or quick solution. The first step is to contact your state dealer board. Almost every state has an administrative agency that may be a subdivision of your state's Department Motor Vehicles or is independent. Virginia has the Motor Vehicle Dealer Board (804-367-1100, Toll Free 877-270-0203, Fax 804-367-1053, or www.mvdb.virginia.gov). Confirm what they know about the dealership closing; find out if the dealership has an insurance bond which most states require the newer dealership to post since it has no track record for being a stable, well-managed dealership; and get the insurance company's name address and where claims are to be filed. Then you contact this insurance company about your claim. Often the bond requirement is a minimum of $25,000, to cover all claims. Thus you should make your claim as soon as possible since the policy limits will be exhausted by other people in your same situation.

Once the bond is exhausted, or if there is no bond, many states have a monetary fund sustained by dealership licensing fees, which has been established to reimburse persons who have suffered loss or damage in connection with the purchase or lease of a motor vehicle due to illegal actions of licensed or registered motor vehicle dealers or salespersons. The amount of the claim will have limits ($20,000 in Virginia), and only covers actual damages and attorney fees, as opposed to punitive damages. Additionally, there may be a limit of the aggregate amount of claims that will be paid for one dealer ($100,000 in Virginia). Virginia's fund is called the Motor Vehicle Transaction Recover Fund. See the Virginia Motor Vehicle Dealer Board's web site noted above for more information. Usually, you must obtain a legal judgment against the dealer for fraud in order to recover. While this may sound daunting, usually the dealer does not respond to the lawsuit and at trial you simply have to put on the evidence of its failure to pay off the trade-in, show the court the late payment notices you received, and show how much this has damaged you monetarily.

This process will take several months; so, before you embark on that route you have to make a preliminary decision: should you make payments on the trade-in you no longer possess or own in order to preserve your credit rating, or, if you cannot afford that, advise the lender what happened, and watch it try to find the trade-in and then sell it and get a deficiency judgment against you for the difference between what you owe it on the trade-in and what it was able to sell the vehicle for at auction. Your lawsuit would be for any monetary loss this has caused you (including damage to your credit), as well as legal fees and punitive damages. But remember the most you can recover from the Transaction Recovery Fund is $20,000 in Virginia, assuming other claims have not exhausted the $100,000 ceiling.

Every U.S. consumer is entitled to a free yearly credit report from each of the three major credit-reporting bureaus - Equifax, Experian, and TransUnion. The official Web site to distribute those reports is AnnualCreditReport.com, created as a result of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACT Act). But a new report from Consumer Reports WebWatch, a Consumers Union project that investigates Web credibility, found that the word “free” in other credit-report sites might mean anything but.

The study looked at 24 sites, some with “free” or “credit” in their names. Most use the enticement of that free report to sell other services consumers might not need. More than half say they’ll give you a free credit report and credit score - a number from 300 to 850 that summarizes your creditworthiness - if you subscribe to a service to monitor changes in your credit report. Typically, those services charge $120 to $160 a year. The purveyors of such services say they help protect you from identity theft and fraud. But their effectiveness is limited, and neither the Federal Trade Commission nor consumer groups, including CU, endorse or recommend them.

CR’s take. When requesting your annual credit reports, go first to www.annualcreditreport.com or call 877-322-8228. If you’re curious about your credit scores, which aren’t included free, you can buy them for about $7 each through the official site.

Consumer Reports, August 2007

In May of 2007, our client began negotiations with a salesman for the purchase of a vehicle and specifically asked if the vehicle had ever been damaged, wrecked, or repaired. He claimed that he was told by the salesman that it had not been damaged or repaired in an accident, that it was a "Certified" used Toyota Corolla, that it was in excellent condition, and he explained that it had been rigorously inspected by Koons and its vehicle history was reviewed via Carfax to determine that the vehicle was qualified to be sold as a Toyota "Certified" Used car. He was also sold an extended warranty or service contract for the car that he purchased. Relying on the warranties and representations, the remainder of the factory warranty, the service contract, the vehicle history, its "Toyota Certified Used Vehicle" status, and representations about the vehicle’s condition from Koons, our client agreed to purchase the vehicle. At no time during the negotiations for the vehicle was our client advised by Koons that the certification of the vehicle would cost him an additional $995.00, since he had been told it was already certified, which the dealership charged him to certify the vehicle, misrepresenting it as a "We Owe" charge on the Buyer’s Order.

In July 2007, the plaintiff took the vehicle to have it appraised at CarMax in Dulles, Virginia for possible resale and at this appraisal he learned that the vehicle had been wrecked, that it had extensive body repairs, that there was possible structural or frame damage, and that CarMax would purchase the vehicle for $8,500.00, about $11,000.00 less than what he paid for it less than two months earlier.

According to the Toyota web site for Toyota Certified Used vehicles, in order for a vehicle to achieve the status as a Toyota "Certified" Used vehicle, it must be "the best of the best", it must pass a "rigorous 160 point quality assurance inspection by factory-trained technicians" and get a Car Fax report to ensure it is worthy of the Toyota Certification process. Our client alleges that the prior accident history, damage, and repairs to the vehicle were known by Koons, or in the exercise of the reasonable diligence, should have been known, prior to the selling of the vehicle to our client, but were never disclosed to him prior to his purchase of the vehicle. He alleges that these repairs were obvious to anyone inspecting the vehicles in the auto purchase industry.

In August 2008, the matter was resolved by a cash payment with the agreement of all parties. This case settled for approximately $52,000.

As you are shopping around, there are things that you should look for in the advertisement. There are many kinds of false advertising. One common misrepresentation includes price and availability of particular models. When clients complain that they were charged more than the advertised price, look for dealer’s stock or inventory number in the ad and on the contract. The dealer may claim that the particular vehicle advertised has already been sold , but you should check it out and make sure that is true.

Another type of false advertisement is in the Classified Advertisement. The ad may look like it has been placed by an individual owner-seller, but could actually be a dealer or dealer employee. In one case, the dealer first advertized the car under his name, then, when it did not sell, the next week the car was in the newspaper advertized it as being sold by a private owner. When a buyer called the "private owner," he identified himself, and said his son-in-law was selling it for him at ABC dealership. After the purchase, on dealer paper, upon investigating the title history, the "private owner" was never in the chain of title. This is a form of bait & switch.

Bait & switch is another form of false advertisement. Consumers may be baited and switched on price, model year, new versus used, and the interest rate or other financing terms.

Dealers also use phony contests and "specials" as another form of false advertisement. This technique is especially common in tent sales and other off-lot locations. The contest may involve a supposedly secret "winning" vehicle which the consumer may "win" by sitting in the right car or having a key that fits the ignition. Consumers are deceptively induced to submit credit applications disguised as contest registration, or may be fraudulently induced to buy a junky or more expensive vehicle on the pretense that they will win a second, better car for "only a dollar."

"Curbstoning" is a the term dealers use for the practice of selling a vehicle in what appears to be an individual, on-the-street transaction. This is done usually because the car dealer does not want to sell the car on the dealer’s lot, often because it has been wrecked and rebuilt, has odometer or title problems, or other substantial defects. In other words, the car is in such bad condition that the unscrupulous dealer does not even want to sell it in his own name.

"Retail" Auctions are often promoted as selling vehicles which have been "seized" by government authorities. Vehicles sold at these auctions are typically very cheap junkers. Consumers must bid without an opportunity for a test drive or mechanical inspection. Most or all sales at these auctions are completely "As Is," which doesn’t leave the consumer with much legal recourse.

If the consumer wants to shop around on the internet, there are other opportunities for fraud and dirty dealing. Websites are often linked to dealerships which will use consumer’s personal information to solicit business. Also, dealer websites could overvalue a potential trade-in vehicle just to get the customer in the door.

The commonly used-car value guides are available online, such as NADA, Edmunds, and Kelly’s. Remember "blue book" value is an average only -- but actual condition and local market determines the true fair market value of a vehicle. Be aware of different values for retail, wholesale and average loan amount and know which one of these you are looking at.

These are several ways a dealer uses dirty dealing to get a consumer to buy a vehicle. Once the consumer is at the dealership, there are many more opportunities for fraud and dirty dealing in buying a vehicle.

The "spot delivery" is a technique that car dealers use to get you to take delivery of a vehicle immediately after you agree on a car deal. But be warned: Just because you put down cash and roll away from the dealership with a new vehicle doesn’t mean you’ll get to keep driving it.

Car sales people know they have to get you when you are "hot," or when you are at the dealership and all worked up emotionally. They are going to do everything they can to get you down the road in your vew vehicle. They do not want to give you a chance to change your mind or develop a case of "Buyer’s Remorse." Most consumers sigh in relief once the paperwork is signed and they are about to leave in their new vehicle. In their own mind the deal is done, so there is no reason to give it any more thought. Increasingly, buyers are signing purchase papers and driving away in their new cars, only to find out that the financing they agreed on didn’t fall into place!

Often, if you are allowing the car dealer to handle the financing - which is a bad idea - the Finance manager will put together some bank papers for you to sign. After you leave, he will then try to get the deal approved at the bank. If for some reason he can not get the deal put together with the bank whose paperwork you signed, he then has to go to another bank. He will then have to get you back in to sign new paperwork. At that point, the consumer is usually told that they must either return the car, unless you want the car to be repossessed, or sign up for sub-par financing at a very high interest rate per year. Sometimes the car-loan term will be for a longer time period. In other words, it is going to cost you more money.

Often, the people squeezed by these spot delivery schemes are the most vulnerable, those with tarnished credit or low income who do not have a lot of alternatives. The bottom line is take your time and do your homework. Think it through and do not let the sales person rush you into anything.

Some courts have found that the deal is complete when a dealer signs the sales contract, rather than when the banks come through with a loan. To see if you have any legal recourse, contact The Consumer Law Group at 804-282-7900.

§ 59.1-197.  Intent 

   It is the intent of the General Assembly that this chapter shall be applied as remedial legislation to promote fair and ethical standards of dealings between suppliers and the consuming public.

§ 59.1-198.  Definitions


   As used in this chapter:

"Business opportunity" means the sale of any products, equipment, supplies or services which are sold to an individual for the purpose of enabling such individual to start a business to be operated out of his residence, but does not include a business opportunity which is subject to the Business Opportunity Sales Act, Chapter 21 (§ 59.1-262 et esq..) of this title.

"Consumer transaction" means:

   1. The advertisement, sale, lease, license or offering for sale, lease or license, of goods or services to be used primarily for personal, family or household purposes;

   2. Transactions involving the advertisement, offer or sale to an individual of a business opportunity that requires both his expenditure of money or property and his personal services on a continuing basis and in which he has not been previously engaged;

   3. Transactions involving the advertisement, offer or sale to an individual of goods or services relating to the individual's finding or obtaining employment; and

   4. A layaway agreement, whereby part or all of the price of goods is payable in one or more payments subsequent to the making of the layaway agreement and the supplier retains possession of the goods and bears the risk of their loss or damage until the goods are paid in full according to the layaway agreement.

"Cure offer" means a written offer of one or more things of value, including but not limited to the payment of money, that is made by a supplier and that is delivered to a person claiming to have suffered a loss as a result of a consumer transaction or to the attorney for such person. A cure offer shall be reasonably calculated to remedy a loss claimed by the person and it shall include a minimum additional amount equaling 10 percent of the value of the cure offer or $ 500, whichever is greater, as compensation for inconvenience, any attorney's or other fees, expenses, or other costs of any kind that such person may incur in relation to such loss; provided, however that the minimum additional amount need not exceed $ 4,000.

"Goods" means all real, personal or mixed property, tangible or intangible. For purposes of this chapter, intangible property includes but shall not be limited to "computer information" and "informational rights" in computer information as defined in § 59.1-501.2.

"Person" means any natural person, corporation, trust, partnership, association and any other legal entity.

"Services" includes but shall not be limited to (i) work performed in the business or occupation of the supplier, (ii) work performed for the supplier by an agent whose charges or costs for such work are transferred by the supplier to the consumer or purchaser as an element of the consumer transaction, or (iii) the subject of an "access contract" as defined in § 59.1-501.2.

"Supplier" means a seller, lessor or licensor who advertises, solicits or engages in consumer transactions, or a manufacturer, distributor or licensor who advertises and sells, leases or licenses goods or services to be resold, leased or sublicensed by other persons in consumer transactions.

§ 59.1-199.  Exclusions


   Nothing in this chapter shall apply to:

   A. Any aspect of a consumer transaction which aspect is authorized under laws or regulations of this Commonwealth or the United States, or the formal advisory opinions of any regulatory body or official of this Commonwealth or the United States.

   B. Acts done by the publisher, owner, agent or employee of a newspaper, periodical, or radio or television station, or other advertising media such as outdoor advertising and advertising agencies, in the publication or dissemination of an advertisement in violation of § 59.1-200, unless it be proved that such person knew that the advertisement was of a character prohibited by § 59.1-200.

   C. Those aspects of a consumer transaction which are regulated by the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.

   D. Banks, savings institutions, credit unions, small loan companies, public service corporations, mortgage lenders as defined in § 6.1-409, broker-dealers as defined in § 13.1-501, gas suppliers as defined in subsection E of § 56-235.8, and insurance companies regulated and supervised by the State Corporation Commission or a comparable federal regulating body.

   E. Any aspect of a consumer transaction which is subject to the Landlord and Tenant Act, Chapter 13 (§ 55-217 et seq.) of Title 55 or the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, Chapter 13.2 (§ 55-248.2 et seq.) of Title 55, unless the act or practice of a landlord constitutes a misrepresentation or fraudulent act or practice under § 59.1-200.

   F. Real estate licensees who are licensed under Chapter 21 (§ 54.1-2100 et seq.) of Title 54.1.

§ 59.1-200.  Prohibited practices 

   A. The following fraudulent acts or practices committed by a supplier in connection with a consumer transaction are hereby declared unlawful:

   1. Misrepresenting goods or services as those of another;

   2. Misrepresenting the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services;

   3. Misrepresenting the affiliation, connection, or association of the supplier, or of the goods or services, with another;

   4. Misrepresenting geographic origin in connection with goods or services;

   5. Misrepresenting that goods or services have certain quantities, characteristics, ingredients, uses, or benefits;

   6. Misrepresenting that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model;

   7. Advertising or offering for sale goods that are used, secondhand, repossessed, defective, blemished, deteriorated, or reconditioned, or that are "seconds," irregulars, imperfects, or "not first class," without clearly and unequivocally indicating in the advertisement or offer for sale that the goods are used, secondhand, repossessed, defective, blemished, deteriorated, reconditioned, or are "seconds," irregulars, imperfects or "not first class";

   8. Advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised, or with intent not to sell at the price or upon the terms advertised.

   In any action brought under this subdivision, the refusal by any person, or any employee, agent, or servant thereof, to sell any goods or services advertised or offered for sale at the price or upon the terms advertised or offered, shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of this subdivision. This paragraph shall not apply when it is clearly and conspicuously stated in the advertisement or offer by which such goods or services are advertised or offered for sale, that the supplier or offeror has a limited quantity or amount of such goods or services for sale, and the supplier or offeror at the time of such advertisement or offer did in fact have or reasonably expected to have at least such quantity or amount for sale;

   9. Making false or misleading statements of fact concerning the reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions;

   10. Misrepresenting that repairs, alterations, modifications, or services have been performed or parts installed;

   11. Misrepresenting by the use of any written or documentary material that appears to be an invoice or bill for merchandise or services previously ordered;

   12. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, using in any manner the words "wholesale," "wholesaler," "factory," or "manufacturer" in the supplier's name, or to describe the nature of the supplier's business, unless the supplier is actually engaged primarily in selling at wholesale or in manufacturing the goods or services advertised or offered for sale;

   13. Using in any contract or lease any liquidated damage clause, penalty clause, or waiver of defense, or attempting to collect any liquidated damages or penalties under any clause, waiver, damages, or penalties that are void or unenforceable under any otherwise applicable laws of the Commonwealth, or under federal statutes or regulations;

   14. Using any other deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, or misrepresentation in connection with a consumer transaction;

   15. Violating any provision of § 3.1-796.78, 3.1-796.79, or 3.1-796.82, relating to the sale of certain animals by pet dealers which is described in such sections, is a violation of this chapter;

   16. Failing to disclose all conditions, charges, or fees relating to:

      a. The return of goods for refund, exchange, or credit. Such disclosure shall be by means of a sign attached to the goods, or placed in a conspicuous public area of the premises of the supplier, so as to be readily noticeable and readable by the person obtaining the goods from the supplier. If the supplier does not permit a refund, exchange, or credit for return, he shall so state on a similar sign. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply to any retail merchant who has a policy of providing, for a period of not less than 20 days after date of purchase, a cash refund or credit to the purchaser's credit card account for the return of defective, unused, or undamaged merchandise upon presentation of proof of purchase. In the case of merchandise paid for by check, the purchase shall be treated as a cash purchase and any refund may be delayed for a period of 10 banking days to allow for the check to clear. This subdivision does not apply to sale merchandise that is obviously distressed, out of date, post season, or otherwise reduced for clearance; nor does this subdivision apply to special order purchases where the purchaser has requested the supplier to order merchandise of a specific or unusual size, color, or brand not ordinarily carried in the store or the store's catalog; nor shall this subdivision apply in connection with a transaction for the sale or lease of motor vehicles, farm tractors, or motorcycles as defined in § 46.2-100;

      b. A layaway agreement. Such disclosure shall be furnished to the consumer (i) in writing at the time of the layaway agreement, or (ii) by means of a sign placed in a conspicuous public area of the premises of the supplier, so as to be readily noticeable and readable by the consumer, or (iii) on the bill of sale. Disclosure shall include the conditions, charges, or fees in the event that a consumer breaches the agreement;

   16a. Failing to provide written notice to a consumer of an existing open-end credit balance in excess of $ 5 (i) on an account maintained by the supplier and (ii) resulting from such consumer's overpayment on such account. Suppliers shall give consumers written notice of such credit balances within 60 days of receiving overpayments. If the credit balance information is incorporated into statements of account furnished consumers by suppliers within such 60-day period, no separate or additional notice is required;

   17. If a supplier enters into a written agreement with a consumer to resolve a dispute that arises in connection with a consumer transaction, failing to adhere to the terms and conditions of such an agreement;

   18. Violating any provision of the Virginia Health Spa Act, Chapter 24 (§ 59.1-294 et seq.) of this title;

   19. Violating any provision of the Virginia Home Solicitation Sales Act, Chapter 2.1 (§ 59.1-21.1 et seq.) of this title;

   20. Violating any provision of the Automobile Repair Facilities Act, Chapter 17.1 (§ 59.1-207.1 et seq.) of this title;

   21. Violating any provision of the Virginia Lease-Purchase Agreement Act, Chapter 17.4 (§ 59.1-207.17 et seq.) of this title;

   22. Violating any provision of the Prizes and Gifts Act, Chapter 31 (§ 59.1-415 et seq.) of this title;

   23. Violating any provision of the Virginia Public Telephone Information Act, Chapter 32 (§ 59.1-424 et seq.) of this title;

   24. Violating any provision of § 54.1-1505;

   25. Violating any provision of the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers' Warranty Adjustment Act, Chapter 17.6 (§ 59.1-207.34 et seq.) of this title;

   26. Violating any provision of § 3.1-949.1, relating to the pricing of merchandise;

   27. Violating any provision of the Pay-Per-Call Services Act, Chapter 33 (§ 59.1-429 et seq.) of this title;

   28. Violating any provision of the Extended Service Contract Act, Chapter 34 (§ 59.1-435 et seq.) of this title;

   29. Violating any provision of the Virginia Membership Camping Act, Chapter 25 (§ 59.1-311 et seq.) of this title;

   30. Violating any provision of the Comparison Price Advertising Act, Chapter 17.7 (§ 59.1-207.40 et seq.) of this title;

   31. Violating any provision of the Virginia Travel Club Act, Chapter 36 (§ 59.1-445 et seq.) of this title;

   32. Violating any provision of §§ 46.2-1231 and 46.2-1233.1;

   33. Violating any provision of Chapter 40 (§ 54.1-4000 et seq.) of Title 54.1;

   34. Violating any provision of Chapter 10.1 (§ 58.1-1031 et seq.) of Title 58.1;

   35. Using the consumer's social security number as the consumer's account number with the supplier, if the consumer has requested in writing that the supplier use an alternate number not associated with the consumer's social security number;

   36. Violating any provision of Chapter 18 (§ 6.1-444 et seq.) of Title 6.1;

   37. Violating any provision of § 8.01-40.2;

   38. Violating any provision of Article 7 (§ 32.1-212 et seq.) of Chapter 6 of Title 32.1;

   39. Violating any provision of Chapter 34.1 (§ 59.1-441.1 et seq.) of this title;

   40. Violating any provision of Chapter 10.2 (§ 6.1-363.2 et seq.) of Title 6.1;

   41. Violating any provision of the Virginia Post-Disaster Anti-Price Gouging Act, Chapter 46 (§ 59.1-525 et seq.) of this title;

   42. Violating any provision of Chapter 47 (§ 59.1-530 et seq.) of this title;

   43. Violating any provision of § 59.1-443.2;

   44. Violating any provision of Chapter 48 (§ 59.1-533 et seq.) of this title;

   45. Violating any provision of Chapter 20 (§ 6.1-474 et seq.) of Title 6.1;

   46. Violating the provisions of clause (i) of subsection B of § 54.1-1115; and

   47. Violating any provision of § 18.2-239.

B. Nothing in this section shall be construed to invalidate or make unenforceable any contract or lease solely by reason of the failure of such contract or lease to comply with any other law of the Commonwealth or any federal statute or regulation, to the extent such other law, statute, or regulation provides that a violation of such law, statute, or regulation shall not invalidate or make unenforceable such contract or lease.

§ 59.1-201.  Civil investigative orders 

   A. Whenever the attorney for the Commonwealth or the attorney for a county, city, or town has reasonable cause to believe that any person has engaged in, or is engaging in, or is about to engage in, any violation of § 59.1-200 or 59.1-200.1, the attorney for the Commonwealth or the attorney for a county, city, or town if, after making a good faith effort to obtain such information, is unable to obtain the data and information necessary to determine whether such violation has occurred, or that it is impractical for him to do so, he may apply to the circuit court within whose jurisdiction the person having information resides, or has its principal place of business, for an investigative order requiring such person to furnish to the attorney for the Commonwealth or attorney for a county, city, or town such data and information as is relevant to the subject matter of the investigation.

B. The circuit courts are empowered to issue investigative orders, authorizing discovery by the same methods and procedures as set forth for civil actions in the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia, in connection with investigations of violations of § 59.1-200 or 59.1-200.1 by the attorney for the Commonwealth or the attorney for a county, city, or town. An application for an investigative order shall identify:

   1. The specific act or practice alleged to be in violation of § 59.1-200 or 59.1-200.1;

   2. The grounds which shall demonstrate reasonable cause to believe that a violation of § 59.1-200 or 59.1-200.1 may have occurred, may be occurring or may be about to occur;

   3. The category or class of data or information requested in the investigative order; and

   4. The reasons why the attorney for the Commonwealth or attorney for a county, city, or town is unable to obtain such data and information, or the reason why it is impractical to do so, without a court order.

C. Within 21 days after the service upon a person of an investigative order, or at any time before the return date specified in such order, whichever is later, such person may file a motion to modify or set aside such investigative order or to seek a protective order as provided by the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. Such motion shall specify the grounds for modifying or setting aside the order, and may be based upon the failure of the application or the order to comply with the requirements of this section, or upon any constitutional or other legal basis or privilege of such person.

D. Where the information requested by an investigative order may be derived or ascertained from the business records of the person upon whom the order is served, or from an examination, audit or inspection of such business records, or from a compilation, abstract or summary thereof, and the burden of deriving or ascertaining the information is substantially the same for the attorney for the Commonwealth or attorney for a county, city, or town as for the person from whom such information is requested, it shall be sufficient for that person to specify the records from which the requested information may be derived or ascertained, and to afford the attorney for the Commonwealth or attorney for the county, city, or town reasonable opportunity to examine, audit or inspect such records and to make copies, compilations, abstracts or summaries thereof.

E. It shall be the duty of the attorney for the Commonwealth or attorney for a county, city, or town, his assistants, employees and agents, to maintain the secrecy of all evidence, documents, data and information obtained through the use of investigative orders or obtained as a result of the voluntary act of the person under investigation and it shall be unlawful for any person participating in such investigations to disclose to any other person not participating in such investigation any information so obtained. Any person violating this subsection shall be guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor and shall be punished in accordance with § 18.2-11. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this section shall not preclude the presentation and disclosure of any information obtained pursuant to this section in any suit or action in any court of this Commonwealth wherein it is alleged that a violation of § 59.1-200 or 59.1-200.1 has occurred, is occurring or may occur, nor shall this section prevent the disclosure of any such information by the attorney for the Commonwealth or attorney for a county, city, or town to any federal or state law-enforcement authority that has restrictions governing confidentiality and the use of such information similar to those contained in this subsection; however, such disclosures may only be made as to information obtained after July 1, 1979.

F. Upon the failure of a person without lawful excuse to obey an investigative order under this section, the attorney for the Commonwealth or attorney for the county, city, or town may initiate contempt proceedings in the circuit court that issued the order to hold such person in contempt.

G. No information, facts or data obtained through an investigative order shall be admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding other than for the enforcement of this chapter and the remedies provided herein.

§ 59.1-201.1.  Attorney General empowered to issue civil investigative demands 

   Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person has engaged in, or is engaging in, or is about to engage in, any violation of this chapter, the Attorney General is empowered to issue a civil investigative demand. The provisions of § 59.1-9.10 shall apply mutatis mutandis to civil investigative demands issued pursuant to this section.

§ 59.1-202.  Assurances of voluntary compliance 

   A. The Attorney General, the attorney for the Commonwealth, or the attorney for a county, city, or town may accept an assurance of voluntary compliance with this chapter from any person subject to the provisions of this chapter. Any such assurance shall be in writing and be filed with and be subject on petition to the approval of the appropriate circuit court. Such assurance of voluntary compliance shall not be considered an admission of guilt or a violation for any purpose. Such assurance of voluntary compliance may at any time be reopened by the Attorney General, or the attorney for the Commonwealth, or attorney for the county, city, or town respectively, for additional orders or decrees to enforce the assurance of voluntary compliance.

B. When an assurance is presented to the circuit court for approval, the Attorney General, the attorney for the Commonwealth, or the attorney for the appropriate county, city, or town shall file, in the form of a motion for judgment or complaint, the allegations which form the basis for the entry of the assurance. The assurance may provide by its terms for any relief which an appropriate circuit court could grant, including but not limited to restitution, arbitration of disputes between the supplier and its customers, investigative expenses, civil penalties and costs; provided, however, that nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize or require the Commonwealth, the Attorney General, an attorney for the Commonwealth or the attorney for any county, city or town to participate in arbitration of violations under this section.

§ 59.1-203.  Restraining prohibited acts 

   A. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, the Attorney General, any attorney for the Commonwealth, or the attorney for any city, county, or town may cause an action to be brought in the appropriate circuit court in the name of the Commonwealth, or of the county, city, or town to enjoin any violation of § 59.1-200 or 59.1-200.1. The circuit court having jurisdiction may enjoin such violations notwithstanding the existence of an adequate remedy at law. In any action under this section, it shall not be necessary that damages be proved.

B. Unless the Attorney General, any attorney for the Commonwealth, or the attorney for any county, city, or town determines that a person subject to the provisions of this chapter intends to depart from this Commonwealth or to remove his property herefrom, or to conceal himself or his property herein, or on a reasonable determination that irreparable harm may occur if immediate action is not taken, he shall, before initiating any legal proceedings as provided in this section, give notice in writing that such proceedings are contemplated, and allow such person a reasonable opportunity to appear before said attorney and show that a violation did not occur or execute an assurance of voluntary compliance, as provided in § 59.1-202.

C. The circuit courts are authorized to issue temporary or permanent injunctions to restrain and prevent violations of § 59.1-200 or 59.1-200.1.

D. The Commissioner of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, or his duly authorized representative, shall have the power to inquire into possible violations of § 59.1-200 or 59.1-200.1, and, if necessary, to request, but not to require, an appropriate legal official to bring an action to enjoin such violation.

§ 59.1-204.  Individual action for damages or penalty 

   A. Any person who suffers loss as the result of a violation of this chapter shall be entitled to initiate an action to recover actual damages, or $ 500, whichever is greater. If the trier of fact finds that the violation was willful, it may increase damages to an amount not exceeding three times the actual damages sustained, or $ 1,000, whichever is greater. Any person who accepts a cure offer under this chapter may not initiate or maintain any other or additional action based on any cause of action arising under any other statute or common law theory if such other action is substantially based on the same allegations of fact on which the action initiated under this chapter is based.

B. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, in addition to any damages awarded, such person also may be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs.

C. No cure offer shall be admissible in any proceeding initiated under this section, unless the cure offer is delivered by a supplier to the person claiming loss or to any attorney representing such person, prior to the filing of the supplier's initial responsive pleading in such proceeding. If the cure offer is timely delivered by the supplier, then the supplier may introduce the cure offer into evidence at trial. The supplier shall not be liable for such person's attorneys' fees and court costs incurred following delivery of the cure offer unless the actual damages found to have been sustained and awarded, without consideration of attorneys' fees and court costs, exceed the value of the cure offer.

D. In any action which the parties desire to settle all matters in dispute, the question of whether the plaintiff shall be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs in accordance with subsections B and C may be tendered to the court for consideration of the amount of such an award, if any.

§ 59.1-204.1.  Tolling of limitation 

   A. Any individual action pursuant to § 59.1-204 for which the right to bring such action first accrues on or after July 1, 1995, shall be commenced within two years after such accrual. The cause of action shall accrue as provided in § 8.01-230.

B. When any of the authorized government agencies files suit under this chapter, the time during which such governmental suit and all appeals therefrom is pending shall not be counted as any part of the period within which an action under § 59.1-204 shall be brought.

§ 59.1-205.  Additional relief 

   The circuit court may make such additional orders or decrees as may be necessary to restore to any identifiable person any money or property, real, personal, or mixed, tangible or intangible, which may have been acquired from such person by means of any act or practice declared to be unlawful in § 59.1-200 or 59.1-200.1, provided, that such person shall be identified by order of the court within 180 days from the date of the order permanently enjoining the unlawful act or practice.

§ 59.1-206.  Civil penalties; attorney's fees 

   A. In any action brought under this chapter, if the court finds that a person has willfully engaged in an act or practice in violation of § 59.1-200 or 59.1-200.1, the Attorney General, the attorney for the Commonwealth, or the attorney for the county, city, or town may recover for the Literary Fund, upon petition to the court, a civil penalty of not more than $ 2,500 per violation. For purposes of this section, prima facie evidence of a willful violation may be shown when the Attorney General, the attorney for the Commonwealth, or the attorney for the county, city, or town notifies the alleged violator by certified mail that an act or practice is a violation of § 59.1-200 or 59.1-200.1, and the alleged violator, after receipt of said notice, continues to engage in the act or practice.

B. Any person who willfully violates the terms of an assurance of voluntary compliance or an injunction issued under § 59.1-203 shall forfeit and pay to the Literary Fund a civil penalty of not more than $ 5,000 per violation. For purposes of this section, the circuit court issuing an injunction shall retain jurisdiction, and the cause shall be continued, and in such cases the Attorney General, the attorney for the Commonwealth, or the attorney for the county, city, or town may petition for recovery of civil penalties.

C. In any action pursuant to subsection A or B and in addition to any other amount awarded, the Attorney General, the attorney for the Commonwealth, or the attorney for the county, city, or town may recover any applicable civil penalty or penalties, costs, reasonable expenses incurred by the state or local agency in investigating and preparing the case not to exceed $ 1,000 per violation, and attorney's fees. Such civil penalty or penalties, costs, reasonable expenses, and attorney's fees shall be paid into the general fund of the Commonwealth or of the county, city, or town which such attorney represented.

D. Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting the power of the court to punish as contempt the violation of any order issued by the court, or as limiting the power of the court to enter other orders under § 59.1-203 or 59.1-205.

E. The right of trial by jury as provided by law shall be preserved in actions brought under this section.

§ 59.1-207.  Unintentional violations 

   In any case arising under this chapter, no liability shall be imposed upon a supplier who shows by a preponderance of the evidence that (i) the act or practice alleged to be in violation of § 59.1-200 or 59.1-200.1 was an act or practice of the manufacturer or distributor to the supplier over which the supplier had no control or (ii) the alleged violation resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted to avoid a violation; however, nothing in this section shall prevent the court from ordering restitution and payment of reasonable attorney's fees and court costs pursuant to § 59.1-204 B to individuals aggrieved as a result of an unintentional violation of this chapter.

Two different plaintiffs had auto fraud cases against a major insurance company. In both cases, the vehicles purchased were involved in a prior collision. As a result of the collisions, the vehicles were treated as a salvage or total loss by the insurance company, but this information was never reported to the state’s DMV The insurance company never obtained a salvage or branded title, or a "rebuilt" title on either vehicle. Both vehicles were the subject of inadequate, improper, incomplete and/or potentially dangerous repair work and/or that while repaired wreck damage is generally undetectable by consumers, these repairs are obvious to persons in the business of buying and selling used vehicles as such. To make matters worse, this is just two cases of thousands of times the insurance company did this with other vehicles. Any vehicle purchased with a "salvage" or "rebuilt" Certificate of Title is worth a small fraction of the retail value of an non-branded, non-wrecked similar vehicle.

In December 2007, the matter was resolved by a cash payment acceptable to all parties. The terms of the settlement are confidential.

Prior to July 2005, a 1999 Volvo wagon was involved in at least two collisions, requiring extensive repairs, which included the front end and the frame. After the first collision, the dealer was advised by the prior owners that the vehicle had been in a collision and the vehicle was traded into Mooers Volvo in July 2002. The dealership, even though it knew about the prior collision, inspected the vehicle to determine if it could be sold as a "Certified" Volvo, and in August 2002 sold the vehicle for $23,900, as "Certified, to the next purchaser, concealing the wreck damage it knew about from her.

During the second owner’s ownership of the vehicle, it was in another serious collision, requiring extensive repairs, and the second owner advised the dealership of the wreck damage. In June 2005, the second owner traded the vehicle in to the dealership, which, after inspecting it, agreed to purchase it from her. Even though it was aware of the two prior collisions and repairs and after becoming aware that portions of the vehicle had been damaged and repainted, the dealership chose to put the vehicle on its car lot for retail sale for a third time.

In July 2005, our client began negotiations with a salesman for the purchase of the vehicle. During the negotiations for the vehicle, the Plaintiff asked the salesman for a safe reliable car, and asked whether the vehicle had ever been in an accident. He replied, "No", and stated that, in fact, the dealership knew the repair history of the vehicle since the dealership had serviced it from "day one", and he showed her what was purported to be the vehicle’s service records. He said the vehicle had been a "one owner" car, that it had been driven by an elderly lady, but they only had one key since the elderly lady’s daughter had the other one. In reliance on the warranties, representations, and promises of the dealership, in July 2005, the Plaintiff purchased the vehicle from the dealership for $9,142.

After numerous problems with the vehicle, the Plaintiff decided to trade it in, and in September 2006 went to CarMax to see what she could get for the vehicle. After an inspection, CarMax reported that the vehicle had extensive body repairs and possible frame damage, and that it would only offer her $3000 for the vehicle. This was when the plaintiff discovered the dealership’s fraud.

In February 2008, the matter was settled for $80,000.00.

A franchise dealership purchased a vehicle several days prior to its purchase by the Plaintiffs. Prior to the dealership purchasing the vehicle, it had ben issued four different titles.

In February 2003, the Plaintiffs began negotiations for the purchase of the van that the dealership said they owned. The two sides came to an agreement about the price of the vehicle. The Plaintiffs advised the dealership that they had a trade-in, and they would also need financing. The dealership would take care of DMV title and paperwork. The Plaintiffs were given 30-day Temporary tags and were advised to transfer the license plates from their trade-in vehicle to the vehicle bought at the dealership.

It is believed that the dealership’s employee suggested transferring tags from the other vehicle, rather than simply using 30-day paper tags indicated on the 30-day temporary registration, since she knew she could not get permanent registration for the vehicle within 30 days, and even though the 30-day registration would run out, at least the vehicle would have permanent plates on it.

The vehicle was sold and delivered to the Plaintiffs, yet the dealership had not secured a certificate of title for it, nor did it possess the certificate of title to the vehicle at that time, nor had the vehicle’s title been assigned to it at that time. At the time of sale of the vehicle to the Plaintiffs, the vehicle was owned and titled in the name of another person or company. At the time the dealership sold the vehicle to the Plaintiffs, the Defendants knew the dealership did not have possession of title to the vehicle, they knew that no title document for the vehicle had been assigned to the dealer and knew the dealer had not secured title to the vehicle in its’ name. This was a clear violation of the Code of Virginia laws.

The title to the vehicle was not delivered or assigned to the dealership by the prior owner until over a year after the dealership sold the vehicle to the Plaintiffs, and was never provided to the creditor to whom the credit contract for the vehicle was assigned.

When the Plaintiffs’ temporary tags expired, they asked the dealership about the problem. They were informed, by the same employee, that she would go down to DMV herself and straighten out the problem. For several months, the same employee said that there was a problem at DMV and it was their fault. Several months went by without any response from the same employee.

About a year after the original sale of the vehicle, the Plaintiffs paid off the loan. At that point, they asked the finance company for the title to the vehicle. The finance company stated that it did not have a title, but that the dealership had it At this point an inquiry to DMV was made to find out on what car the license plates were registered to. The Plaintiffs discovered that the plates were not registered to any vehicle, after which they notified the dealer that they wanted to cancel the sale since the title was never put into the Plaintiffs’ name, and because they were driving in an vehicle which had never been registered with DMV, which was improperly licensed, and which they believed put them at risk with the police for breaking the law. The Plaintiffs then attempted to cancel the contract and returned the vehicle to the dealership.

Not until over fourteen months after the purchase, and after the vehicle had been returned to the dealership by the Plaintiffs, did the dealership cause an application for a duplicate title to be issued in the prior owner’s name, which it is believed that the dealership then assigned to the Plaintiffs without their authorization.

After returning the vehicle the Plaintiffs were forced to purchase another vehicle from another dealer to take the place of the vehicle from the first dealership. The Plaintiffs have been damaged because they fully paid for a vehicle that was never put in their name prior to them cancelling the contract and returning the vehicle and then never received a refund of their money once they cancelled the contract. Thus they are out not only the full purchase price plus the interest they paid on the loan, but also the vehicle, plus the cost of the substitute transportation, plus their inconvenience and embarrassment.

In January 2008, the matter was resolved by a cash payment with the agreement of all parties. The terms of the settlement are confidential.

In March 2003, a dealer sold a previously wrecked vehicle to our clients. The dealership claimed that some touch-up paint work was done when asked if the vehicle had previously been damaged. When asked what was the touch-up paint was for, they were told "sh-t happens." In fact, the vehicle had been previously sold as salvage and repaired, all of which was known by the dealership since a prior owner they sold the vehicle to cancelled the sale due to the salvage history the prior owner discovered. The car dealer did refund all of the prior owner’s money plus some more, and then the dealer tried the sale again on our clients.

In December 2007, this case settled for less than $95,000.

In October 2004, the plaintiffs went to purchase a new 2004 vehicle. During negotiations for the vehicle, Plaintiffs discussed the vehicle with their salesman and asked specifically about the 1063 miles that were on the odometer. The salesman told them that the vehicle was new, that the mileage came from its use by the sales staff and from the mileage accumulated when it was driven to and from another car dealership from which this dealership purchased the vehicle. The salesman deliberately concealed from the Plaintiffs that the vehicle was a used vehicle, something he knew or should have known.

The vehicle was not purchased from another dealer but sold directly to this dealership by Ford Motor Company and ownership transferred to this dealership, which was discovered on the Certificate Of Origin. The mileage put on the vehicle, after it received the vehicle from Ford Motor Company was from its use during test drives, use as a demonstrator, and the personal or business of employees of this dealership; and the Plaintiffs were never told that the vehicle was a "used" vehicle.

Based on the rear end problems noted when they first purchased the car, and the apparent out of alignment of the body or frame and resulting shimmying that cannot be fixed, it is believed that the vehicle sustained some kind of rear end damage prior to the Plaintiffs’ purchase of it, possibly during the thousand plus miles the vehicle was driven while owned by this dealership. In August 2006, the plaintiffs discovered that the vehicle they purchased was not new but used. The plaintiffs would not have purchased the vehicle if they had known they were buying a used car, or one that had damage in the rear end and possible frame defects.

In July 2007, this case settled for approximately $60,000.00.

This lawsuit is about an often fraudulent practice in the automobile sales industry called a "yo-yo sale" or a "spot delivery". Under this scheme, the auto dealer sells a car to the consumer "on the spot" without regard to whether any third party will agree to assignment of the car note. Typically, the consumer will sign all necessary paperwork at the behest of the dealer and will receive temporary or transferred tags, a set of keys, and possession of the automobile. The consumer leaves the dealership believing he or she owns the vehicle.

In this case, the dealer is unwilling to accept the terms that the various finance companies are willing to pay for an assignment of the car note; in other words, the dealer wants to make more money selling the loan. This is where the term "yo-yo sale" comes from. Because the car dealer cannot make enough money selling the paper, the dealer attempts to "undo" or cancel the sale, and yank it back from the buyer, telling the buyer that he or she must come in and sign a new loan on less favorable terms or merely illegally repossessing the vehicle, as in the instant case. The dealer also does not send the consumer any written notice of adverse action.

In June 2007, the matter was resolved by a cash payment with the agreement of all parties. The terms of the settlement are confidential.

Two different plaintiffs had cases against the same franchise dealership in Richmond. Both vehicles were sold as “Certified Pre-Owned” vehicles. In one case, the certified vehicle was involved in a prior wreck, which was not disclosed to the plaintiff. In the second case, the certified vehicle was sold with a Salvage Title.

 In May 2007, these two cases together settled for approximately $200,000.00.

TIMES-DISPATCH COLUMNIST

Sunday, January 14, 2007

Nedra Peyton of Richmond, a working mother of two small children, purchased a used car in October.

She agreed to make payments every two weeks for three years. She had no experience buying cars. The car came with a 180-day limited warranty.

Within the first month, Peyton said, the car broke down twice and had to be towed to the place she bought it for repair. It also was missing a heating and air-conditioning part and she said the front end was making a rubbing noise.

Each time she took the car back, the repairs were made but she was given a hard time, she said. The second time it was towed, she angrily told them to keep the car and refund her money.

She was told that if she left it, it would be a voluntary repossession and she'd still have to pay the note.

A voluntary repossession means the person voluntarily gave the vehicle back for whatever reason as opposed to it being involuntarily repossessed.

. . .

If this happens to you or someone you love, what should you do?

John C. Gayle Jr. of The Consumer Law Group on Libbie Avenue in Richmond responded.

Gayle cautioned against abandoning a newly purchased car at the dealership. "It doesn't make any sense," he said.

For one reason, "it goes on their books as a voluntary repossession." That negatively impacts a person's credit score.

Steve Katz of the credit reporting agency TransUnion in Chicago and Rod Griffin of Experian in Dallas said whether it's a voluntary or involuntary repossession, a person's score will be impacted equally.

A repossession is "very, very bad," Griffin said. Another reason not to abandon the vehicle is the dealer may have misrepresented its condition at the time of sale.

If you've given it back, "How are you going to prove anything?" Gayle said.

Dealers resell repossessed vehicles at auction for whatever they can get, then come after the one it was repossessed from to collect the difference.

If a newly purchased used car turns out to be a clunker, you can sue under Virginia's so-called "Lemon Law" only if you bought it while there was still time left on the original manufacturer's warranty.

You have up to 18 months from the date that the warranty first went into effect to sue, Gayle said.

If you've purchased a used car that turns out to be a heap:

• Read your contract. If it says you purchased the car "as is," you're responsible for repairs and the dealer has no obligation to assist with repairs.

• Stay current on your payments. If you're late, the dealer has the right to take back the vehicle and sell it.

• You may be able to rescind the sale. "You really ought to get an attorney's advice" before doing this, Gayle said.

But, if you can't, stop driving the car and put the dealership on notice, by certified mail, that in 30 days you intend to rescind the sale unless it corrects the problem.

• Read your rights. Go to www.theconsumerlawgroup.com.

If you're planning to, but haven't yet purchased a used vehicle, run its vehicle identification number, or VIN, through Carfax.

It might be free through the dealership or $24.99 at www.carfax.com.

If possible, have it checked out at a body shop and by a mechanic.

What happened with Peyton?

She did not leave her car at the place she bought it. "I believe I have an oil leak" and the check engine light was on but "just went off," she said.

However, "I haven't had any major problems recently"
Peyton said she looked up the car's book value after buying it. "I am stuck with a $20,000 car worth only $7,000 [$13,000 for the car, plus interest]," she said.

Contact staff writer Iris Taylor at itaylor@timesdispatch.com or (804) 649-6349.

• Under the Virginia Lemon Law, a "Lemon" is a vehicle that has a problem that "significantly impairs the use, value or safety of the vehicle" to you and which the dealer has not corrected within a reasonable number of repair attempts.


• 
  

  A vehicle (car, truck, motorcycle, or moped used "substantially" for personal, household, or family purposes) can be a "lemon" if it meets one of the following criteria within 18 months of the manufacturer’s limited warranty going into affect with the first owner:

  
  1.  If the same "significant" problem is worked on 3 times (i.e. you have three repair orders) and the problem still exists after that, then it's a lemon. Or,
  
  2.  If you have a life-threatening defect that affects the drive-ability of the vehicle, and it still exists after one repair attempt, then you have a lemon. Or,

    3.  If the vehicle has been in the shop 30 or more calender days for ANY problem or defect, and there is still something legitimately wrong with the car, then it's a lemon. 

• If the dealer has not fixed the problem(s) you must then notify the manufacturer about these problems IN WRITING. (Do not notify the manufacturer by e-mail, fax or by phone, and preferably notify them by certified mail.)  Send a Certified/Return Receipt requested letter to the manufacturer. Make a copy of your letter for your records (SEE Sample Letter to Put the Manufacturer on Notice).  Please include the following information:

   1.   Identify the vehicle - year, make, model, VIN (Vehicle Identification Number).

   2.   List the dates you have taken it back and for what problems, and that you want the problems corrected once and for all.

  3.   Include a copy (you keep the originals) of each repair order.

  4.   Request a buyback under the Virginia Lemon Law if they are unable to fix the problems.

  5.   Keep a signed copy of the letter. 

  6.   Send the letter Certified/Return Receipt.  The manufacturer has 15 days from their date of receipt to make a final repair. The date will be stamped on the green card when you receive it back from the Post Office. If the manufacturer does not contact you to schedule a repair within the 15 days, wait out the 15 days and then call The Consumer Law Group at 804-282-7900. If the manufacturer contacts you, makes a final repair attempt, and the problem returns, then call The Consumer Law Group at 804-282-7900. If the manufacturer offers to buyback or to replace the vehicle, call The Consumer Law Group at 804-282-7900 to make sure the manufacturer is paying you what you are entitled under the Virginia Lemon Law. 

  7.   Keep the green certified return receipt card, where the recipient signed for the letter and dated it, with a copy of your letter.

• 
  

  A Virginia Lemon Law lawsuit must be filed within 18 months of the warranty first going into effect with the first owner of the vehicle. However, if you have filed for arbitration prior to this 18-month period expiring, then your deadline to file suit is extended by 12 months from the date of any decision by the arbitrator.

  
  
  
  

• John and Jane Doe v. Ford Motor Company: Plaintiff’s 2005 Ford Expedition left front wheel keeps trying to put itself in 4X4 going down interstate at high speeds. Low tire pressure light coming on and saying that there is a fault.

In June 2007, the defendant agreed to repurchase the vehicle for the full purchase price plus all collateral charges, and to pay attorney’s fees associated with the vehicle and/or the lawsuit.

• John Doe v. Ford Motor Company: Plaintiff’s 2006 Ford F250 Truck has a severe vibration while driving.

In August 2007, the defendant agreed to repurchase the vehicle for the full purchase price plus all collateral charges, and to pay attorney’s fees associated with the vehicle and/or the lawsuit.

• John Doe v. Ford Motor Company: Plaintiff’s 2005 F-150 has a problem with the transmission slipping in and out of gear. Plaintiff also hears a loud clunking noise.

In October 2007, the defendant agreed to repurchase the vehicle for the full purchase price plus all collateral charges, and to pay attorney’s fees associated with the vehicle and/or the lawsuit.

• John Doe v. Ford Motor Company: Plaintiff’s 2005 F-150 has a problem with the transmission slipping in and out of gear. Plaintiff also hears a loud clunking noise.

In October 2007, the defendant agreed to repurchase the vehicle for the full purchase price plus all collateral charges, and to pay attorney’s fees associated with the vehicle and/or the lawsuit.

• John Doe v. Ford Motor Company: Plaintiff’s 2005 F-150 has a problem with the transmission slipping in and out of gear. Plaintiff also hears a loud clunking noise.

In October 2007, the defendant agreed to repurchase the vehicle for the full purchase price plus all collateral charges, and to pay attorney’s fees associated with the vehicle and/or the lawsuit.

• Jane Doe v. General Motors Corporation: Plaintiff’s 2006 Pontiac has a leaking trunk. The roof also makes a noise while driving. The power steering failed twice while driving.

In February 2007, the defendant agreed to repurchase the vehicle for the full purchase price plus all collateral charges, and to pay attorney’s fees associated with the vehicle and/or the lawsuit.

• John Doe v. General Motors Corporation: Plaintiff’s 2006 Pontiac G6 has a leak in the sunroof. The sunroof panels make a loud knocking sound when going over even small bumps. The gas gage will suddenly drop.

In November 2007, the defendant agreed to repurchase the vehicle for the full purchase price plus all collateral charges, and to pay attorney’s fees associated with the vehicle and/or the lawsuit.

• John and Jane Doe v. General Motors Corporation: Plaintiffs’ 2005 Chevrolet Equinox has a rear view mirror panel not working. The service engine light and TC light keeps coming on.

In December 2007, the defendant agreed to repurchase the vehicle for the full purchase price plus all collateral charges, and to pay attorney’s fees associated with the vehicle and/or the lawsuit.

• John and Jane Doe v. General Motors Corporation: Plaintiffs’ 2006 Chevy Equinox has heating and air conditioning problems. The rear end makes a thumping noise at low speeds. They are also having transmission problems.

In March 2008, the defendant agreed to repurchase the vehicle for the full purchase price plus all collateral charges, and to pay attorney’s fees associated with the vehicle and/or the lawsuit.

• John and Jane Doe v. General Motors Corporation: Plaintiffs’ 2006 Chevrolet Silverado Z-71 will shimmy and vibrate at all spee